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[1] Following man-made or natural catastrophes, widespread and long-lasting disruption

of lifelines can lead to economic impacts for both business and residential lifeline users.
As a result, the total economic losses caused by infrastructure damage may be much
higher than the value of damage to infrastructure itself. In this paper, we consider the
estimation of economic impacts on businesses and residential consumers resulting from
water supply disruption. The methodology we present for estimating business interruption
losses assumes that marginal losses are increasing in the severity of disruption and that
there may be a critical water availability cutoff below which business activity ceases. To
estimate residential losses from water supply interruption, we integrate consumers’
demand curves, calibrated to water agency price and quantity data. Our methodologies are
spatially disaggregated and explicitly account for the time profile of infrastructure repair
and restoration. As an illustration, we estimate the economic losses to business and
residential water users of one of the major water supply systems of the San Francisco Bay
Area of California resulting from two potential earthquake scenarios, a magnitude
7.9 event on the San Andreas Fault and a magnitude 7.1 event on the Hayward Fault. For
the business loss estimation, our modeling framework is general enough to calculate and
compare losses using loss functions from several previous studies. Estimated business and
residential losses for the San Andreas event are $14.4 billion and $279 million,
respectively. For the Hayward event, estimated business and residential losses are
$9.3 billion and $37 million, respectively.
Citation: Brozović, N., D. L. Sunding, and D. Zilberman (2007), Estimating business and residential water supply interruption losses
from catastrophic events, Water Resour. Res., 43, W08423, doi:10.1029/2005WR004782.

1. Introduction
[2] Lifeline interruption as a result of natural or manmade disasters can lead to widespread disruption of the
daily activities of business and residential consumers. The
total economic losses caused by infrastructure damage may
be much higher than the value of damage to infrastructure
itself. In recent years, a growing literature on methodologies
to estimate the economic impacts of lifeline disruption has
emerged. In particular, studies have focused on water
supply, electric power, and transportation infrastructure
[Chang, 2003; Chang et al., 2002; Rose, 2004; Rose et
al., 1997; Tierney and Nigg, 1995]. Because of its age and
spatial extent, water supply infrastructure in many urban
areas is particularly vulnerable to interruption in disasters. A
variety of methods—from extremely data-intensive I-O and
computable general equilibrium approaches [Cochrane et
al., 1999; Rose and Liao, 2005] to simpler partial equilibrium approaches [Chang, 2003; Chang et al., 2002; Khater
et al., 1993] and surveys [Silicon Valley Manufacturing
Group, 2002; Tierney, 1997; Tierney and Dahlhamer,
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1998]—have been used to analyze regional impacts on
business productivity as a result of water supply disruption.
[3] In this paper, we consider the estimation of economic
impacts on businesses and residential consumers resulting
from water supply interruption or disruption. The methodology we present for estimating business interruption losses
is quite general and allows implementation of several
existing methods that analyze business resilience to unexpected shocks. However, we improve on existing studies
in two ways. First, we assume that marginal losses are
increasing in disruption severity. Second, we assume that
there is a critical water availability cutoff below which
business activity ceases. We argue that each of these
changes conforms better than existing models to both
economic theory and limited empirical evidence. For residential loss estimation, we derive inverse demand curves
that may be calibrated to local data and integrated to give
willingness to pay to avoid water supply disruption. Our
business interruption loss and residential welfare loss methodologies are consistent and directly comparable, consider
the time profile of infrastructure repair and water supply
restoration, and are spatially disaggregated so that damage
estimates can be compared across regions with different
patterns of business and residential water users and disruptions. Using spatial data on water outages resulting from
two large potential earthquakes in the San Francisco Bay
Area of California, we estimate business and residential
water supply interruption losses. Our results suggest that, at
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least in large urban areas, the loss of welfare to residential
users from lifeline interruption in some catastrophic events
may approach the magnitude of business interruption losses,
and thus should be included in disaster mitigation planning.
Although we use earthquake-induced water supply disruption for our example, the technique presented is widely
applicable to other lifeline utilities, such as transport networks and electrical systems, and to other shocks, such as
hurricanes, tornados, or terrorist attacks.
[4] Section 2 of this paper presents a methodology for the
estimation of business interruption losses due to water supply
interruptions, and compares this methodology to existing
research on postcatastrophe business resilience. In section 3,
we discuss previous efforts to estimate consumers’ willingness to pay to avoid water supply interruption and present a
methodology for residential loss estimation. Using spatial
data on water outages resulting from two large potential
earthquakes in the San Francisco Bay Area of California,
business and residential water supply interruption losses are
estimated in section 4. Section 5 is the conclusion.

2. Estimating Business Losses From Water
Supply Interruptions
[5] What is the potential magnitude of the impact of water
shortages and outages on businesses? Khater et al. [1993]
estimated that normal water service would take up to ninety
days to resume following a large San Francisco Bay Area
earthquake. Following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, portions
of New Orleans were without water service for over two
months. Following catastrophes such as this, businesses
would be unable to provide running water in sinks, toilets
and drains, and adequate water or pressure for fire sprinkling
systems. Similarly, many large commercial and industrial
businesses use rooftop cooling towers that run water through
fan-powered chillers, routing water to building subsystems
for drinking and sanitation, for filtration and use in industrial
processes, and into closed fire protection and cooling system
loops. Even closed loop cooling systems lose some water
through evaporation and need replenishing in order to
prevent chiller overheating and shutdown, which in turn
would shut down air conditioning, laboratory temperaturecontrolled environments, computer server clusters, and any
other water cooled equipment such as electrical generators
and vacuum pumps. Moreover, many research and manufacturing facilities also need to pretreat and posttreat water
in order to maintain required water quality standards for
production and discharge. Even if alternative supplies of
water, such as groundwater, are available to these industries
in case of shortages, the cost and difficulty of recalibrating
equipment to the change in water quality may be large.
[6] In 2002, the Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group
undertook a survey of 28 corporate members on the
importance of water supply reliability; more than half of
the companies surveyed were involved in manufacturing,
and a similar proportion were in the high-technology sector
[Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group, 2002]. Two thirds of
the companies surveyed suggested that a thirty day interruption in water supply water service interruption would
force them to shut down completely. Additionally, many of
the companies surveyed stated that they had no backup
plans for the event of unexpected, severe rationing or
complete water outages. Similar interviews with commer-
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cial and industrial water users in the San Francisco Bay
Area of California also suggest that longer water supply
interruptions would have serious operational impacts on
businesses [Bay Area Economic Forum, 2002].
[7] In recent years, a focus of disaster preparedness and
management has been the measurement of disaster resilience in communities, where resilience has been broadly
defined as the extent to which communities can absorb
extreme events without large losses [Bruneau et al., 2003;
Chang and Shinozuka, 2004]. In a business setting, resilience to unexpected interruption of input supply has been
defined in several studies as the proportion of normal
production that would occur in the event of a complete
outage of that production input [Applied Technology
Council, 1991; Chang, 2003; Chang et al., 2002]. Thus
a business with a resilience of 1 would be able to continue
indefinitely at full capacity in the event of unexpected loss of
a production input (this scenario is not consistent with the
assumption of profit maximization by the business). Conversely, a business with a resilience of 0 would be forced to
shut down following complete loss of the production input of
interest. For levels of outage less than a complete outage,
previous studies have assumed that there is a linear relationship between total production loss and shortage level, and
that the first 5% of any outage can be absorbed by businesses
with no loss of economic activity [Applied Technology
Council, 1991; Chang et al., 2002; Khater et al., 1993].
[8] For a water supply interruption in region i at time t, the
severity of the water shortage may be defined as zit 2 [0, 1],
where zit = 0 corresponds to a complete outage and zit = 1
corresponds to normal service. We can account for some
portion of water supply being unaffected by supply interruption (for example, through groundwater pumping or
interconnectedness and mutual help agreements with other
service providers) by defining ai as the proportion of water
supply potentially affected by catastrophic outage in region i.
Then, for industry sector j in region i with a resilience at time
t of rijt facing rationing of zit, the proportional loss of daily
economic output, lijt(zit), is given by

lijt ðzit Þ ¼

8
>
<0

if ai ð1  zit Þ  0:05

1  rijt
>
:
½ai ð1  zit Þ  0:05
0:95

if ai ð1  zit Þ > 0:05
ð1Þ

Note that this definition of loss can apply to both industry
sectors and individual businesses [Chang et al., 2002].
Published empirical estimates of business resilience vary
significantly. In a study of earthquake-induced outages in
the San Francisco region, Khater et al. [1993] (abbreviated
as KSR) report tables of predicted productivity losses by
industry sector and rationing level, implying a resilience of
0.1 (the ability to operate at 10% of normal output with no
water) for the electronics manufacturing industry, but of 0.8
for wholesale and retail trade. KSR assumed that productivity losses were time-invariant, so that longer water supply
interruptions would not reduce output more per day than
short interruptions, and thus @rijt/@t = 0. Chang et al. [2002]
(abbreviated as CSS) developed business resilience factors
based on surveys of businesses following the 1994 Northridge, California earthquake [Tierney, 1997], and from
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Memphis, Tennessee [Tierney and Dahlhamer, 1998].
Nearly all outages following the Northridge earthquake
were limited to less than one week, and CSS suggested that
for this interval, a complete outage would result in a wide
range of business effects [Chang et al., 2002]. Data for
mining, a high-resilience sector, produced an estimated
resilience of 0.73, whereas health services, a low-resilience
sector, had an estimated resilience of 0.27; both durable and
nondurable manufacturing facilities had estimated resiliences of 0.42, and wholesale and retail trade had
resiliences of around one half. Estimation for outages of
more than two weeks suggested that @rijt/@t < 0, and that
after two weeks resilience in all sectors would be in the
range of 0.19 to 0.44 (specific sectors as follows [Chang et
al., 2002]: mining (0.44); health services (0.19); durable and
nondurable manufacturing (0.28); wholesale trade (0.30);
retail trade (0.28)). Although they did not calculate industry
resilience, Woo and Lo also found evidence that @rijt/@t < 0
for nonresidential users experiencing water shortages in
Hong Kong [Woo and Lo, 1993].
[9] From an economic perspective, the loss estimation
equation in (1) has several shortcomings. First, firms’
behavior at small levels of shortage is inconsistent with
profit maximization. From equation (1), lijt = 0 if total
water availability is greater than or equal to 95% of normal.
Assuming a positive price on water as a production input,
this implies that all firms could make higher profits by
voluntarily reducing their water use by 5 percent rather than
operating at current levels. Second, a value of rijt > 0 over
time implies that firms can continue production indefinitely
with zero water availability. As will be discussed below,
although this may be a valid approximation for short-lived
outages, it is more unreasonable for service outages that
may last weeks or months. Third, for shortages greater than
5 percent, the marginal loss as shortages increase in severity
is constant, as @lijt/@zit = (1  rijt)ai/0.95 and an increasing
value of zit corresponds to a decreasing rationing level. A
constant marginal loss implies that a business can adapt to all
levels of shortage with the same ease. An alternative approach would be to assume that the marginal loss function is
increasing in the level of shortage, implying that businesses
find it increasingly difficult to adjust to water supply shortfall. In this paper, we propose a different loss estimation
equation that deals with each of these inconsistencies: we use
an increasing marginal loss as shortage severity increases,
allow complete shutdown of the firm to occur, and assume
that profit-maximizing behavior implies that losses are positive (though potentially very small) for all levels of water
supply shortage. As the severity of rationing increases, we
assume that marginal losses increase until a critical water
availability cutoff is reached and business activity ceases.
Water supply rationing beyond the cutoff level incurs no
further damages, as output is zero.
[10] We assume that each industry sector has a minimum
proportion of its normal water availability below which
continuing operation is impossible, defined for sector j at
time t as g jt. Thus g jt 2 [0,1), where g jt = 0 implies that
sector j can operate at full capacity even if zit = 0 and the
sector has no water available to it. As g jt increases, sector j
becomes less and less resilient to water supply disruption
and shuts down at smaller and smaller water supply shortfalls relative to normal supply. Between the cutoff level g jt
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and the normal daily water use defined by zit = 1, we assume
that the marginal lost value of production is linear in the
level of water supply cutback. The proportional daily loss of
output value for industry sector j at time t in geographic
region i is then given by
8
 2
2
>
>
< 1  rijt ai ð1  zit Þ
2
ð1  g jt Þ
lijt ðzit Þ ¼
>
>
:1 r
ijt

if ai ð1  zit Þ < ð1  g jt Þ
if ai ð1  zit Þ

ð1  g jt Þ
ð2Þ

[11] The loss functions represented by equations (1) and
(2) are compared in Figure 1, which shows values of lijt(zit)
for the retail trade sector calculated for different levels of
water shortage. Figure 1 shows how the assumption of a
constant marginal loss function (as used by KSR and CSS)
versus a linear marginal loss function (equation (2)) determines the proportional loss of output for any given water
shortage. All three methodologies have similar and very
small losses for small decreases in available water. For more
severe outages, which methodology yields the largest loss
estimate depends on the duration and severity of the outage,
as well as the particular value of resilience.
[12] If fit(zit) is the probability density function of water
disruptions zit in region i at time t then considering a time
period of T days until the complete reinstatement of normal
water service, with J business sectors in each of I regions
with normal daily value of production equal to Vij, gives the
following economic loss estimate for business interruption:
Lbus
IT ¼

T X
I X
J Z
X
t¼1 i¼1 j¼1

1

Vij lijt ð xÞfit ð xÞdx

ð3Þ

0

[13] If the probability distribution of loss profiles fit(zit)
over time is not available, a simple approximation is to use a
two part distribution for zit that divides business water users
into those with complete outages and those with some
amount of water rationing, assumed constant across sectors
in a region but allowed to vary across regions and time,
given by zit. If qit is the proportion of businesses within
region i that are experiencing complete outages at time t, the
economic loss estimate then simplifies to
Lbus
IT ¼

T X
I X
J
X



Vij qit þ ð1  qit Þlijt ðzit Þ

ð4Þ

t¼1 i¼1 j¼1

Note that if qit = 0 and zit = 1 for any region, normal water
service exists and the business interruption loss estimate
will be zero for water users in region i at time t. On the basis
of the resolution of available information, equation (4) can
easily be extended using any discrete distribution of regionspecific rationing levels.
[14] The loss estimate in (4) using either equation (1) or
equation (2) represents a partial equilibrium model such as
that applied by Khater et al. [1993] or Chang et al. [2002].
Alternative approaches to hazard loss estimation that explicitly include the interlinkages between industries include
I-O and computable general equilibrium (CGE) models
[Cochrane et al., 1999; Rose and Liao, 2005]. As Rose
[2004] discusses, I-O models are linear and rigid and do not
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Figure 1. Business productivity loss curves comparing representative business loss curves for this
study, Chang et al. [2002] (CSS), and Khater et al. [1993] (KSR). This figure assumes that ai = 1 and
uses equations (1) and (2) together with retail trade resilience estimates.
allow input substitution by industries. As a result, I-O
models represent upper bounds on direct and indirect loss
estimates. Conversely, CGE modeling does allow the analysis of the potential role of price signals or input substitutability across linked industries and the labor market in
determining the potential economic impacts resulting from
catastrophic water supply shortages [Rose and Liao, 2005].
However, in a catastrophe loss estimation setting, CGE
models have two serious shortcomings. First, such models
were developed to analyze long-run equilibrium resulting
from changes in the price or availability of inputs, and the
resulting behavioral adjustments across the economy. Arguably, catastrophic lifeline interruption is an extremely
short term, disequilibrium phenomenon during which policy
makers care most about immediate costs. Second, because
of the underlying CES production functions used, CGE
modeling cannot analyze the impacts resulting from complete outage of any production input. Thus such models
must either assume that complete outages cannot occur or
that every industry has costless, indefinite availability of
backup supplies. Moreover, in a detailed CGE study of
water supply shortages in the Portland metropolitan area,
Rose and Liao [Rose and Liao, 2005] found that estimated
indirect impacts were only about 22 percent of estimated
direct impacts (equivalent to a multiplier effect of 1.22), and
that both positive and negative indirect effects were observed. Thus, given that the data requirements for a wellexecuted I-O or CGE model are large and that previous
studies suggest that differences in estimated impacts may be
relatively small overall and of ambiguous sign by industry,
we argue that a simple business loss estimation methodology such as that presented in equations (2) – (4) is both
extremely useful for decision makers and easy to implement
and interpret.
[15] There are several important issues in the estimation
of the economic impacts of water supply interruption that
are outside of the scope of analysis of this paper (Rose

[2004] provides a detailed discussion of many of these
issues). These include irreversible damages related to water
supply interruptions, double counting of damages, and the
role of water supply outages in exacerbating fire following
earthquakes. We discuss each of these concerns briefly
below.
[16] The methodology presented in this paper assumes
that the only economic impacts on businesses from water
rationing and outages are from lost revenue, and that the
scale of economic output can be changed instantaneously
and with no cost. However, extended business closures due
to water supply interruption may entail irreversibility (at a
local scale) if businesses either shift purchasing or relocate
permanently to a different region. Thus the long-term
damage from a reduced economic base and lower employment could be considerable, even after the region as a whole
has recovered from the immediate effects of a catastrophe
and attendant lifeline disruption.
[17] We focus on the estimation of economic impacts
specifically related to water supply interruption. Of course,
total economic damages resulting from loss of life or
property in a catastrophe such as a major earthquake would
be enormous. However, analyzing those impacts is beyond
the scope of this paper. Here, we do not consider damages to
life, property, or other lifelines resulting from the catastrophic event that caused water supply interruption. One
way to view this is as an implicit assumption that there is no
overlap between catastrophe-related damages to the water
supply infrastructure and other damages. This may be
correct for some kinds of catastrophes such as targeted
terrorist attacks or natural hazards that affect lifelines at a
distance from the populations they serve. However, it is
quite clear that businesses and residences that are destroyed
by ground shaking in an earthquake are unable to experience losses due to water supply shortages in the postearthquake period. We argue that, at least for many potential
catastrophes in the developed world, our methodology is
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relatively insensitive to the effects of such double counting.
This is because even earthquakes in major urban areas are
predicted to kill only a small proportion of the population
and destroy a relatively small proportion of the stock of
buildings. As a result, economic losses from water supply
interruption to businesses and residences that are relatively
undamaged in a catastrophe will generally far outweigh the
double counting of damages to destroyed property. Note
that for some natural catastrophes, double counting may be
an issue. For example, if large areas of a city are inundated
by a storm surge, as was the case with Hurricane Katrina in
New Orleans, water supply interruption to these areas will
not lead to any further incremental damage.
[18] Finally, one of the major potential impacts of water
supply shortages is that the operation of emergency services
may be compromised [Scawthorn et al., 1993]. In particular,
if water is not available for fire fighting purposes, fires may
spread further or burn uncontrolled. Fire-related losses to
property will thus almost certainly increase. The differential
increase in fire damage is an indirect economic loss attributable to water shortages. Estimates of incremental fire
damage as a result of water supply interruption will depend
on both the nature of the catastrophe and the availability of
secondary water supplies and other technology in the region
of interest.

3. Estimating Residential Losses From Water
Supply Interruptions
[19] Using the concept of resilience to define economic
losses is not as useful in a residential setting as in a business
setting, as residential water users do not produce an output
with monetary value. However, it is clear that water supply
interruptions can impose a significant hardship on residential users. Losses can be measured by consumers’ willingness to pay to avoid water service interruptions, defined as
the amount of money that residential customers would pay
in order to avoid a break in water service of some duration.
[20] Residential water use falls into several broad categories, such as drinking and basic sanitation, bathing and
cooking, laundry use, and outdoor irrigation. The willingness to pay for water by residential customers will also
depend on the intended use of water. Thus residential
consumers will be willing to pay a large amount of money
for water for drinking and basic sanitation, less for water to
wash clothes, and a much smaller amount for water for
washing cars, filling swimming pools, and outdoor irrigation. In order to analyze indirect economic losses to residential customers from water supply interruption, it is
necessary to estimate willingness to pay for any potential
shortfall in available water. Because reliable empirical data
on consumer demand under significant water shortages are
unavailable, alternative approaches must be taken to estimate demand. Three separate approaches have been used to
generate estimates of willingness to pay to avoid water
supply interruption: contingent valuation, mathematical
programming, and integration of estimated demand curves.
Below, we discuss each of these methodologies and their
advantages and limitations.
[21] Stated preference techniques may be used for the
direct elicitation of willingness to pay. In this case, an
appropriate survey instrument is administered to a representative sample of residential water users, and econometric
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analysis is used to estimate a willingness to pay function.
Contingent valuation has been applied in the estimation of
residential willingness to pay for increased water supply
reliability by several previous studies [Barakat and
Chamberlin, Inc., 1994; Griffin and Mjelde, 2000; Howe
and Smith, 1993; Howe et al., 1994]. In general, these
studies consider consumers’ choices between alternative
probabilistic shortage scenarios, and thus provide estimates
of value for changes in water supply reliability. Moreover,
existing studies consider relatively small water supply shortfalls (Barakat and Chamberlin, Inc. consider shortages of
10 –50%, Griffin and Mjelde consider the range 10– 30%,
and Howe and Smith and Howe et al. consider a ‘‘standard
annual shortage event’’ where residential outdoor use is
restricted to 3 hours a day, but indoor use is unrestricted),
and no existing study attempts to value residential welfare
loss from complete water supply outages.
[22] Taken together, contingent valuation studies suggest
that consumers are fairly insensitive in their valuation of the
severity, duration, and frequency of water supply shortfall.
Several studies have found threshold effects, with a high
willingness to pay to avoid any shortage, and then decreasing average willingness to pay to avoid shortages of
increased duration, severity, or frequency [Barakat and
Chamberlin, Inc., 1994; Griffin and Mjelde, 2000]. For
example, data from northern Colorado reported in Griffin
and Mjelde [Griffin and Mjelde, 2000] suggest a total
household willingness to pay to avoid immediate, known
shortfalls of WTP = $18.41 + $0.212 (% water shortage)
+ $0.344 (days of shortage). Griffin and Mjelde also find
inconsistencies in their results: consumers stated higher
monthly willingness to pay to avoid future, probabilistic
water supply shortages than total willingness to pay to avoid
immediate shortages of the same duration and severity. In a
comprehensive survey covering all California water agencies, Barakat and Chamberlin, Inc. [1994] found mean
monthly household willingness to pay ranging from
$11.63 to avoid a yearlong 10 percent reduction service
with an expected frequency of one in ten years, to a monthly
value of $16.92 to avoid a yearlong 50 percent reduction in
service with an expected frequency of one in twenty years.
Additionally, the Barakat and Chamberlin study found that
consumers were more likely to pay higher amounts to avoid
larger, infrequent shortages than small, frequent shortages.
[23] In an alternative approach to stated preference studies, Lund [1995] assumes that consumers exhibit costminimizing behavior and uses a mathematical programming
approach to analyze the costs of alternative short- and longterm conservation measures that consumers could implement to avoid the impacts of water shortage. Although he
does not provide durations of expected shortfall, he considers shortages of between 50 and 200 gallons per household
per day, yielding estimates of willingness to pay of between
$51.03 per household per year and $144.10 per household
per year for the shortage scenarios considered.
[24] Finally, construction of residential demand functions
for water allows direct estimation of willingness to pay. This
approach was used by Jenkins et al. [2003] to estimate the
costs of urban water scarcity under current institutional and
hydrological conditions and predicted California population
and industrial water demand for 2020. Because adequate
empirical data to characterize the demand function for all
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BROZOVIĆ ET AL.: ESTIMATING WATER SUPPLY INTERRUPTION LOSSES

W08423

levels of water shortage do not exist, Jenkins et al. assumed
a constant elasticity demand function, calibrated using
regional observed prices and quantities consumed and
estimates of the price elasticity of demand. Using these
calibrated demand functions, Jenkins et al. estimate monthly
loss functions for shortages of up to 50% rationing levels,
and suggest that by 2020, the average annual cost of urban
water scarcity in California could be as high as $1.6 billion.
[25] In this study, we adapt the approach of Jenkins et al.
[2003] by deriving an equation for the estimation of
consumer willingness to pay to avoid water supply interruptions. Residential welfare losses from water supply
interruption can then be analyzed in a framework analogous
to that developed for businesses in section 2. By definition,
the price elasticity of demand for water at any price P
and quantity consumed Q is given by h = (dQ/dP)(P/Q).
This definition may be rearranged and integrated to give an
inverse demand function for water, namely P(Q) = e(ln Q)/h+C,
where C is a constant of integration. Integrating this
expression for P(Q) will give a consumer’s willingness to
pay to avoid water shortages, where the willingness to pay
to avoid a shortage equivalent to any restricted quantity of
water consumed is given by the area under the demand
curve between the unrestricted consumption quantity and
that restricted quantity. Define the water price and quantity
consumed when there are no shortages as Pbaseline and
Qbaseline respectively. Then the daily loss of welfare Wi(zit)
for a consumer in region i experiencing a water shortage at
time t of zit, leading to a reduced water availability given by
Qr(zit)  Qbaseline, is
Z

Z

Qbaseline

Wi ðzit Þ ¼

Qbaseline

PðQÞdQ ¼
Qr ðzit Þ

eðln QÞ=hþC dQ

Qr ðzit Þ

"
h
Qr ðzit Þ
Pbaseline Qbaseline 1 
¼
1þh
Qbaseline

1þh
h

#
ð5Þ

where the second line uses the results that @/@Q{h/(1 +
h)Qe(ln Q)/h + C} = e(ln Q)/h + C and that P(Q1)/P(Q2) = (Q1/
Q2)1/h. The second line of equation (5) is valid when 1 <
h < 0, implying an inelastic residential demand for water.
This assumption is not unduly restrictive, as a meta-analysis
by Espey et al. [1997] found that 90% of reported residential
price elasticities of demand for water were in the range
(0.75, 0), and meta-analysis by Dalhuisen et al. [2003]
reported a mean price elasticity of demand of 0.41, a
median price elasticity of 0.35, and suggested that in
general residential demand for water is price inelastic.
[26] Note that with a constant elasticity demand function,
the willingness to pay to avoid a complete water supply
outage (Qr = 0) is not defined. Here, we assume that the
government would be able to provide a minimum amount of
water to maintain basic health and sanitation throughout the
period of complete outages (for example, by trucking water
to distribution points), and that consumers in affected areas
would not generally face a price for access to this water.
However, provision and distribution of water for basic
health and sanitation in large urban areas would be extremely costly to the government; we assume that these
costs would be paid for by all taxpayers rather than consumers in the area of the outage. The costs of emergency
water provision thus represent a social cost of water supply
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outage, but their calculation is beyond the scope of this
paper. Thus equation (5) does not attempt to value how
much consumers would pay to stay alive, but how much
they value water above their basic requirements. As such,
residential loss estimates calculated using equation (5)
should be viewed as lower bounds.
[27] The United Nations defines a ‘‘basic water requirement’’ of 6.6 gallons per capita per day as the minimum
required for drinking and basic sanitation, and a minimum
requirement of 13.2 gallons per capita per day (gpcpd) when
bathing and cooking are included [Gleick, 1996]. These
amounts may be thought of as the minimum needed to
survive for an extended period of time, such as would be
encountered following a major earthquake. Thus we constrain the water availability Qr(zit) to be in the interval
[BWR, Qbaseline]. We report results from assuming BWR
takes values of 6.6 gallons per capita per day, 10 gallons per
capita per day, and 13.2 gallons per capita per day to capture
the possible sensitivity of cutoff choice as a result of using a
constant elasticity demand function. Average per capita
daily demands for residential users can be used for the
value of Qbaseline in equation (5). If Qr(zit) is calculated
using the assumption that basic water requirements for
health and sanitation are met, then Qr(zit) = BWR + (1 
ai(1  zit))(Qbaseline  BWR), where as in the business loss
estimation, ai represents the proportion of region i’s water
supply affected by interruption. Note also that from
equation (5) we have assumed that willingness to pay to
avoid water shortages does not change over time. This is a
conservative assumption; it is likely that willingness to pay
for any quantity of water will increase with the length of
the disruption, particularly as the possibility of irreversible
damage to investments such as landscaping increases.
[28] In order to obtain an estimate of the overall indirect
losses from water supply interruption, the individual daily
welfare losses Wi need to be aggregated across consumers in
each region and across regions. Define Ni as the number of
residential consumers in region i and fit(zit) as the probability
density function of water disruption in region i at time t.
Then, considering I regions and a time period of T days until
the complete reinstatement of normal water service gives the
following residential economic loss estimate:
Lres
IT ¼

T X
I Z
X
t¼1 i¼1

1

Ni Wi ð xÞfit ð xÞdx

ð6Þ

0

If detailed information on the probability distribution of loss
profiles fit(zit) over time is not available, a simple discrete
approximation dividing consumers into two groups, those
with complete outages and those with some rationing, may
be used instead. If qit is the proportion of residential
consumers within region i that are experiencing complete
outages, the residential economic loss estimate (equation (6))
simplifies to
Lres
IT ¼
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T X
I
X

Ni ðqit Wi ð0Þ þ ð1  qit ÞWi ðzit ÞÞ

t¼1 i¼1

¼

T X
I
X
t¼1 i¼1

Ni Wi ð0Þ qit þ ð1  qit Þ

Wi ðzit Þ
Wi ð0Þ

ð7Þ
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The second line of equation (7) is directly analogous to the
simple equation for business interruption losses, equation (4).
In the residential context, NiWi(0) is the total consumer
surplus of residential water users in region i during a period
of normal water service, and Wi(zit)/Wi(0) is the proportion
of consumer surplus remaining at rationing level zit. Note
that for regions where ai < 1, a rationing level of zit = 0
corresponds to some availability of water from alternative
sources, such as groundwater or interlinkages and mutual
help agreements with other service providers. Note also that
equation (7) assumes that residential consumers’ willingness
to pay to avoid water supply interruptions are homogeneous
within any region. If there are large intraregional variations
in willingness to pay, as may be the case if there are
significantly different residential types such as apartments
and large single-family houses, then equation (7) may be
easily extended to include this heterogeneity as well.

4. Example: Earthquake-Induced Water Supply
Interruption in the San Francisco Bay Area,
California
[29] As an example of our methodology, we estimate the
economic losses to businesses and residential water users
resulting from earthquake-induced disruption of one of the
major water supply systems of the San Francisco Bay Area of
California. We consider two potential earthquake scenarios: a
magnitude 7.9 earthquake on the San Andreas Fault, and a
magnitude 7.1 earthquake on the Hayward Fault.
[30] San Francisco’s water system captures rain and
snowmelt runoff in the Hetch Hetchy reservoir in the Sierra
Nevada mountains near Yosemite National Park, and moves
it through a 167-mile series of tunnels, aqueducts, treatment
plants and pipelines, to reservoirs and turnouts along its route
through the southern portion of the Bay Area and into the city
of San Francisco. The Hetch Hetchy system is managed and
run by the San Francisco Public Utility Commission (SFPUC).
Hetch Hetchy facilities cross at least five active earthquake
fault zones: the San Andreas, Hayward, Calaveras, Greenville,
and Great Valley fault zones. A probability of around 60% is
assigned to the occurrence of a major, damaging earthquake in
the greater San Francisco Bay Region by 2031 [Working
Group On California Earthquake Probabilities, 2003]. All
of the major Hetch Hetchy facility components are at least fifty
years old [Bay Area Economic Forum, 2002]. Some, including
the Crystal Springs and San Andreas dams and reservoirs,
predate the Hetch Hetchy system and were constructed in the
nineteenth century. Key sections of the Hetch Hetchy delivery
system have not been seismically retrofitted and braced, and
most facilities have little or no redundancy built into them, so
that even relatively small system failures can cut off service
while repairs are undertaken.
[31] The Hetch Hetchy system routes 260 million gallons
per day (mgd) of water to 2.4 million customers in four
counties [Bay Area Economic Forum, 2002]. The city of
San Francisco, with a population of 800,000, uses approximately one third of Hetch Hetchy water. The remainder is
supplied to 28 suburban water authorities and other large
wholesale customers represented in negotiations with
SFPUC by the Bay Area Water Supply and Conservation
Agency (BAWSCA; previously known as the Bay Area
Water Users Association, or BAWUA). Although several
large water agencies (Alameda County Water District, Santa
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Table 1. Data for Residential and Business Welfare Loss
Calculationsa

Water Agency
Alameda
Belmont
Brisbane
Burlingame
Coastside
Cordilleras
CWS-Bear Gulch
CWS-Mid Pen
CWS-SSF
Daly City
East Palo Alto
Estero
Hayward
Hillsborough
Los Trancos
Menlo Park
Millbrae
Milpitas
Mountain View
N. San Jose
N. Santa Clara
North Coast
Palo Alto
Purissima Hills
Redwood City
San Bruno
San Francisco
Skyline
Stanford
Sunnyvale
Westborough

ADD,b Average Cost,
Supply
Residential
gpcpd
$ Per Gallon
Fraction ai Consumers Ni Qbaseline
Pbaseline
0.25
1
1
1
0.616
1
0.905
1
0.859
0.555
1
0.98
1
1
1
1
1
0.601
0.793
0.926
0.169
1
0.991
1
1
0.581
1
1
0.72
0.437
1

318,250
25,500
4,063
30,000
17,990
40
65,830
120,820
54,060
104,571
27,300
34,252
128,000
11,760
1,230
10,200
21,394
65,000
76,025
7,000
102,500
39,667
61,200
5,800
83,000
41,750
800,000
1,631
24,700
131,200
9,990

98.84
98.93
50.97
97.33
69.42
159.08
158.74
96.97
67.75
63.76
50.92
97.86
82.79
292.17
86.73
149.49
90.36
74.43
86.36
115.00
112.83
66.37
128.08
321.19
89.13
70.32
95.50
84.27
49.05
95.20
67.29

0.00281
0.00414
0.00579
0.00320
0.00405
0.00365
0.00328
0.00289
0.00235
0.00271
0.00241
0.00199
0.00273
0.00578
0.00365
0.00182
0.00341
0.00234
0.00286
0.00201
0.00242
0.00497
0.00517
0.00324
0.00223
0.00368
0.00242
0.00876
0.00517
0.00207
0.00286

a
Data are adapted from Bay Area Water Users Association [2000], Bay
Area Water Supply and Conservation Agency [2006], and Eidinger [2001].
The supply fraction ai represents the proportion of water consumed in water
agency i delivered from the Hetch Hetchy system. The value of Pbaseline for
Stanford was taken to be the same as that for Palo Alto, and prices for
Cordilleras and Los Trancos were taken as the average cost for special
districts [Bay Area Water Supply and Conservation Agency, 2006]. The city
of San Francisco operates tiered pricing based on conservation affidavits on
file, but in 2002 total commodity charges per residential user were equal to
those of San Jose; accordingly, we adjust for the difference in average daily
use to estimate Pbaseline.
b
ADD is average daily demand.

Clara, Milpitas, Sunnyvale, and Daly City) have diversified
supplies, seventeen of the suburban customers are completely dependent on Hetch Hetchy for their water and
another six are more than 75% dependent on it (Table 1
and Figure 2).
4.1. Water Supply Interruption and
Restoration Profiles
[32] Existing geotechnical reports prepared for BAWUA
and the SFPUC Facilities Reliability Program (Phase II)
outline the spatial distribution of water supply outages and
system recovery following major earthquakes [Eidinger,
2001; Water Reliability Partnership, 2000]. Earthquakeinduced damage to the Hetch Hetchy water supply system
will produce two kinds of impacts on water users. First,
following a major earthquake, some proportion of water
users will experience a complete loss of SFPUC water
supply (q in equations (4) and (7)). Note that a complete
outage of SFPUC water only corresponds to zero water
availability for those users for which ai = 1 (Table 1).
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Figure 2. Water agencies served by the Hetch Hetchy system: 1, Alameda County WD; 2, MidPeninsula WD; 3, City of Brisbane; 4, City of Burlingame; 5a, Bear Gulch – CWS; 5b, City of San
Carlos – CWS; 5c, City of San Mateo – CWS; 5d, City of South San Francisco– CWS; 6, Coastside
County WD; 7, Cordilleras Mutual Water Association; 8, City of Daly City; 9, City of East Palo Alto; 10,
Estero Municipal Improvement District; 11, Guadalupe Valley Municipal Improvement District; 12, City
of Hayward; 13, Town of Hillsborough; 14, Los Trancos County WD; 15, City of Menlo Park; 16, City of
Millbrae; 17, City of Milpitas; 18, City of Mountain View; 19, North Coast County WD; 20, City of Palo
Alto; 21, Purissima Hills WD; 22, City of Redwood City; 23, City of San Bruno; 24, City of San Jose;
25, City of Santa Clara; 26, Skyline County WD; 27, Stanford University; 28, City of Sunnyvale;
29, Westborough WD. Data are from SFPUC and BAWSCA. WD, water district; CWS, Cal Water Service
Co. In this analysis, CWS –San Carlos and CWS – San Mateo are joined as CWS – Mid Peninsula. In
2003, CWS – Mid Peninsula and CWS – S. San Francisco consolidated into the current Bayshore District.
Note also that Guadalupe Valley is excluded from our analysis because of insufficient data.
Second, those users that still receive water via the piped
system (a proportion of users given by 1  q) may
nonetheless have water rationing during the system repair
and recovery period, with the proportion of normal water
service available to these users in region i at time t given by
1  ai(1  zit). On the basis of information by Eidinger
[2001], we define six geographic regions for the San
Andreas M 7.9 earthquake event and four geographic
regions for the Hayward M 7.1 earthquake event. Within
each of these regions, Hetch Hetchy water users will
experience similar time profiles of water supply outages
and rationing until normal service is restored. The pattern of
water supply interruption and rationing following a major
earthquake is shown for each group in Figures 3 and 4. Note
that the time profiles of water supply outages and rationing
for the two earthquake scenarios are based on engineering
analyses of the Hetch Hetchy system alone. Earthquakeinduced effects on adjacent water service providers such as
the East Bay Municipal Utility District or the Santa Clara
Valley Water District, as well as these providers’ potential
responses to earthquakes, are beyond the scope of this
analysis. However, for those users that have interlinkages
with other service providers, or alternative sources of water
such as groundwater (see the values of ai in Table 1), we

make the conservative assumption that in any earthquake
event, these alternative sources will be able to continue
operating at normal service levels, so that the range of
possible rationing levels for service provider i at time t is
given by [1  ai(1  zit), 1].
4.2. Business Loss Estimates
[33] Business and institutional users account for 30% of
San Francisco water demand (26 mgd) and 25% of demand
throughout the BAWSCA service territory (65 mgd). Important users of Hetch Hetchy water include the computer,
semiconductor, biotechnology, automotive, aerospace, tourism, and telecommunications industries, electric utilities, as
well as schools and hospitals and smaller water-dependent
businesses such as restaurants, glass and metal fabricators,
beverage plants and food processors.
[34] As functional relationships between water use and
value of output for individual industries are presently
unavailable, we use county-level data from the 2002 U.S.
Economic Census (available at http://www.census.gov/
econ/census02), and focus on five sectors of activity:
manufacturing; wholesale trade; retail trade; professional,
technical and scientific services; and accommodation and
food services. Together, these five sectors account for the
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Figure 3. Water supply interruptions and rationing to Hetch Hetchy customers resulting from a San
Andreas Fault M 7.9 earthquake. The variable q represents the proportion of customers in each group that
are without Hetch Hetchy water. For those customers receiving Hetch Hetchy water, the variable z
represents the rationing level (where z = 1 corresponds to no rationing). Note that both q and z are
bounded in the interval [0, 1] and that water agencies for which ai < 1 will have higher levels of overall
available water in the range [1  ai(1  zit), 1]. Group membership by BAWSCA and other agencies is
defined as follows: group 1 (Brisbane, Burlingame, CWS – Mid Peninsula, CWS –South San Francisco,
Estero, Hillsborough, Millbrae, North Coast, and Westborough), group 2 (Daly City and San Bruno),
group 3 (Belmont, CWS – Bear Gulch, Cordilleras, East Palo Alto, Los Trancos, Menlo Park, Palo Alto
(City), Purissima Hills, Redwood City, San Jose, and Skyline), group 4 (Milpitas, Mountain View, Santa
Clara, Stanford, and Sunnyvale), group 5 (Alameda and Hayward), and group 6 (San Francisco).
Information in this figure is adapted from Eidinger [2001].

majority of economic activity within the Bay Area. The
relevant four counties for the analysis are San Mateo
County, San Francisco County, Alameda County and Santa
Clara County. In 2002, the total annual value for the five
sectors used in the production loss analysis for these four
counties was $334 billion, with county- and sector-specific
values shown in Table 2. We assume that the SFPUC water
supply system provides water to the whole of San Mateo
and San Francisco Counties, and to businesses that account
for 50% and 80% of economic activity in Alameda County
and Santa Clara County, respectively. County-level economic activity data can then be decomposed into the same
geographic groups as the water supply impacts in Figures 3
and 4 (see Table 3). For each group, we assume that the
reliance of businesses on SFPUC water as a proportion of
their total water use is given by the mean of ai values for
water agencies within that particular group. For the group
definitions used in the analysis and shown in Figures 3 and 4,
the group mean values of ai are between 0.44 and 1.
[35] Using equations (1), (2), and (4), the data in Tables 1,
2, and 3 and the water supply interruption and restoration
profiles in Figures 3 and 4, business losses from water supply

interruption were estimated for the two water supply interruption and restoration scenarios (Tables 4, 5, and 6). We
estimate four different business loss models:
[36] 1. Equation (2) (linear marginal loss), assuming that
shutdown is possible, so that rijt = 0, that g jt = 0.5 for the
manufacturing and accommodation and food sectors, and
that g jt = 0.2 for the other sectors analyzed.
[37] 2. Equation (2) (linear marginal loss), assuming that
shutdown is not possible so that rijt > 0, that @rijt/@t < 0,
using industry sector-specific data on rijt from Chang et al.
[2002], that g jt = 0.5 for the manufacturing and accommodation and food sectors, and that g jt = 0.2 for the other
sectors analyzed.
[38] 3. Equation (1) (constant marginal loss), assuming
that shutdown is not possible so that rijt > 0 and that @rijt/
@t < 0, using industry sector-specific data on rijt from
Chang et al. [2002].
[39] 4. Equation (1) (constant marginal loss), assuming
that shutdown is not possible so that rijt > 0 and that @rijt/
@t = 0, using industry sector-specific data on rijt from
Khater et al. [1993].
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Figure 4. Water supply interruptions and rationing to Hetch Hetchy customers resulting from a Hayward
Fault M 7.1 earthquake. Variables used are as defined in Figure 3. Group membership by BAWSCA and
other agencies is defined as follows: group 1 (CWS – Bear Gulch, Cordilleras, East Palo Alto, Hayward,
Palo Alto (City), Redwood City, San Jose, and Skyline), group 2 (Alameda, Milpitas, Santa Clara,
Stanford, and Sunnyvale), group 3 (San Francisco), and group 4 (Belmont, Brisbane, Burlingame, CWS –
Mid Peninsula, CWS – South San Francisco, Coastside, Cordilleras, Daly City, Estero, Hillsborough,
Los Trancos, Menlo Park, Millbrae, Mountain View, North Coast, Palo Alto (City), Purissima Hills,
Redwood City, San Bruno, Stanford, and Westborough). Italics denote cities with partial shortages within
the group; it is assumed that half of the daily water demand for these water providers is unaffected by an
M 7.1 earthquake on the Hayward Fault, and the remainder follows the graphs above. Information in this
figure is adapted from Eidinger [2001].
[40] For Model 1, Table 4 shows the group- and sectorspecific damages for the M 7.9 San Andreas earthquake
scenario, and Table 5 shows the group- and sector-specific
damages for the M 7.1 Hayward earthquake scenario. The
total business interruption loss estimates using Model 1 are
$14.4 billion for the San Andreas earthquake scenario over
the sixty day period before the full resumption of normal
water service. By sector, the total loss estimates are as
follows: manufacturing ($3.9 billion); wholesale trade

($4.9 billion); retail trade ($2.4 billion); professional, scientific and technical services ($2.6 billion); and accommodation and food services ($0.7 billion). Unsurprisingly, the
largest group losses occur in groups 1, 3, and 6, which are
predicted to have the most severe water disruptions. Losses
in group 4, which includes a large portion of economic
Table 3. Business Activity by County and Group Water Supply
Regions for Earthquake Scenariosa
County

Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6

Table 2. Business Activity by County and Sectora
Sector

San Francisco

San Mateo

Santa Clara

Alameda

Manufacturing
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Professional,
scientific,
and technical
Accommodation
and food

3,589
8,897
8,883
14,142

8,305
16,798
9,017
6,513

47,110
68,095
20,035
17,494

29,632
41,553
16,512
7,487

3,547

1,471

3,037

2,051

a
Data are given in millions of dollars and are taken from the 2002 U.S.
Economic Census, representing annual values for each sector in each
county. No county value for wholesale trade is reported for Santa Clara
county for 2002; the value reported here is taken from the 1997 U.S.
Economic Census. Values reported represent total sales, shipments, receipts,
revenue, or business done, as described in the 2002 U.S. Economic Census.

San Francisco
San Mateo
Santa Clara
Alameda

0
0.33
0
0

San Andreas M 7.9
0
0
0
0.33
0.33
0
0
0.4
0.4
0
0
0

San Francisco
San Mateo
Santa Clara
Alameda

0
0.33
0.264
0.25

Hayward
0
0
0.264
0.25

a

M 7.1
1
0
0
0.67
0
0.264
0
0

0
0
0
0.5

1
0
0
0

-

-

Shown is the proportion of each county’s business activity that is located
in each group with similar water supply interruption and restoration profiles
(see Figures 3 and 4). For example, we assume that 50% of business
activity in Alameda county is potentially impacted and 80% of business
activity in Santa Clara county is potentially impacted by interruption of
Hetch Hetchy service.
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Table 4. Business Interruption Losses for Users of Hetch Hetchy Water Resulting From a San Andreas Fault
M 7.9 Earthquakea
Group

Manufacturing

Wholesale

Retail

Professional/Technical

Accommodation/Food

Total

1
2
3
4
5
6
Sector

336
247
2,013
874
45
408
3,923

633
241
2,538
567
31
852
4,862

340
129
851
167
12
851
2,350

245
93
708
146
6
1,355
2,553

59
44
159
56
3
404
725

1,613
754
6,269
1,810
97
3,870
14,414

a
Group definitions and time paths of water supply interruptions and rationing follow Figure 3. Damage figures are reported
in millions of dollars. The estimates in this table assume that rijt = 0 and that g jt = 0.5 for the manufacturing and
accommodation and food sectors and that g jt = 0.2 for the other sectors analyzed.

activity in Santa Clara county, are reduced by the availability
of alternative water sources (compare Tables 1, 2, and 3).
[41] Total business interruption losses are estimated as
$9.3 billion for the Hayward earthquake scenario using
Model 1 (Table 5). By sector, the total loss estimates are
as follows: manufacturing ($3.3 billion); wholesale trade
($3.4 billion); retail trade ($1.3 billion); professional, scientific and technical services ($1.0 billion); and accommodation and food services ($0.3 billion). In this scenario,
losses by geographic group are greatest in groups 1 and 2,
which are closest to the Hayward fault and are predicted to
have the most severe shortages (Figure 4). Note that in this
scenario, San Francisco and adjacent areas on the San
Francisco peninsula (groups 3 and 4) are estimated to have
relatively small losses, even though there is significant
economic activity, because shortages are predicted to be
quite limited in nature.
[42] Total business loss estimates for the two earthquake
scenarios and each of the four models described above are
presented in Table 6. All four models produce loss estimates
of the same order of magnitude, with the San Andreas
earthquake scenario producing losses approximately 50%
higher than the Hayward earthquake scenario. Model 4,
which assumes that shutdown does not occur as a result of
water supply interruption and that resilience is constant over
time, and uses industry-specific resilience estimates from
KSR, yields the lowest estimates for both earthquake scenarios. Model 1, using a linear marginal loss (equation (2))
and allowing shutdown in the case of severe shortages,
yields the highest estimates of business losses. All of these
business loss estimates are enormous: many billions of
dollars for water supply interruption without considering
any other damages. However, the region impacted by our
earthquake scenarios includes the high-technology hub of

Silicon Valley, as well as many other high-value businesses.
As a further comparison, Chang et al. [2002] analyzed the
consequences of water supply disruption from an M 7.5
earthquake close to Memphis, Tennessee. They estimated
that during extended water supply disruption, mean monthly
losses would be 20.5% of monthly gross output. Using the
Model 1 results (Table 6), this study finds that mean
monthly losses during the San Andreas earthquake scenario
would be 25.9% of monthly gross output (calculated as
14.41/(334/6)), and mean monthly losses during the Hayward earthquake scenario would be 16.8% of monthly gross
output. Thus our loss estimates are quite consistent with the
study of Chang et al., particularly given that the earthquake
magnitude scale is logarithmic.
4.3. Residential Loss Estimates
[43] The SFPUC water supply system provides service to
a residential customer base of 2.4 million people. Data
available from the FY 1999– 2000 BAWUA annual survey
provide residential per capita water use (Table 1 and Bay
Area Water Users Association [2000]). In the Hetch Hetchy
service area, residential water consumption varies from a
low of 50.9 gallons per capita per day in the East Palo Alto
Water District to a high of 321.2 gallons per capita per day
in the Purissima Hills Water District (Table 1 and Figure 2).
The differences in average residential water use across
SFPUC customers in large part reflect differences in amount
of outdoor irrigation. Average per capita daily demands for
residential users from each water provider were used for the
value of Qbaseline in equation (5) (Table 1), and Qr(zit) was
calculated using the assumption that basic water requirements for health and sanitation were met, so that Qr(zit) =
BWR + (1  ai(1  zit))(Qbaseline  BWR). Similarly, values
of Pbaseline were calculated from reported water provider
average consumer costs per unit of water, exclusive of

Table 5. Business Interruption Losses for Users of Hetch Hetchy Water Resulting From a Hayward Fault
M 7.1 Earthquakea
Group

Manufacturing

Wholesale

Retail

Professional/Technical

Accommodation/Food

Total

1
2
3
4
Sector

2,108
835
78
305
3,326

2,644
466
90
206
3,406

967
155
90
80
1,292

674
107
144
63
988

168
55
77
30
330

6,561
1,618
479
684
9,341

a
Group definitions and time paths of water supply interruptions and rationing follow Figure 4. Damage figures are reported
in millions of dollars. The estimates in this table assume that rijt = 0 and that g jt = 0.5 for the manufacturing and
accommodation and food sectors and that g jt = 0.2 for the other sectors analyzed.
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Table 6. Comparing Estimates of Business Interruption Losses for San Andreas Fault M 7.9 and Hayward Fault
M 7.1 Earthquakesa

Model

Equation (2),
Shutdown Possible

Equation (2),
No Shutdown,
@rijt/@t < 0

Equation (1),
No Shutdown,
@rijt/@t < 0

Equation (1),
No Shutdown

San Andreas M 7.9
Hayward M 7.0

14,414
9,341

9,453
6,022

9,641
6,631

5,236
3,876

a
Time paths of water supply interruptions and rationing by group follow Figures 3 and 4. Estimated business interruption
losses are reported in millions of dollars.

service charges (Table 1 and Bay Area Water Supply and
Conservation Agency [2006]).
[44] Losses to residential consumers following our two
scenario earthquakes were calculated using equations (5)
and (7), the data in Table 1, water supply interruption and
restoration profiles in Figures 3 and 4, a price elasticity of
demand for residential water of 0.41, and a basic water
requirement of 10 gpcpd. Following a magnitude 7.9 earthquake on the San Andreas Fault, our methodology estimates
residential losses of $279.20 million, with the largest losses
closest to the fault in the San Francisco peninsula (Table 7).
Losses outside of the peninsula region are predicted to be
quite small, totalling less than $2.5 million, as water
interruption is limited to relatively small, short outages.
Similarly, even though group 2 (Daly City and San Bruno)
is located close to the San Andreas fault, residential welfare
losses are estimated to be small as there is a limited
reliance on Hetch Hetchy water, and our analysis assumes
that alternative sources of water are unaffected by the
disruption scenario. Conversely, in the M 7.1 Hayward fault
scenario, residential welfare losses are estimated to total
$36.94 million, with almost all welfare losses occurring in
the East Bay and only relatively small losses on the San
Francisco Peninsula (Table 7).
[45] In order to determine how residential welfare losses
as determined by equation (5) vary with the choice of price
elasticity of demand and basic water requirement, we calculated losses using alternative values of h and BWR (Table 8).
Alternative values of h chosen were 0.35 and 0.51,
following the median and mean values reported in the
meta-analyses of Dalhuisen et al. [2003] and Espey et al.
[1997], respectively. As expected from equation (5), estimates of welfare loss increase as residential water use
Table 7. Residential Welfare Losses for Users of Hetch Hetchy
Water Resulting From San Andreas Fault M 7.9 and Hayward Fault
M 7.1 Earthquakesa
Group Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
Total
a

San Andreas M 7.9
116.11
1.04
61.99
1.95
0.36
97.76
279.20

becomes more price inelastic, or as basic water requirement
(the lower cutoff for welfare measurement in equation (5))
decreases. In particular, a more price-inelastic residential
water demand increases the loss estimates more for the San
Andreas earthquake scenario than for the Hayward scenario.
This is because a larger proportion of residential consumers
experience severe outages in the former scenario than the
latter (compare Figures 3 and 4), and this translates into
much higher willingness to pay estimates with a more
inelastic demand. In the context of the model presented
here, a lower basic water requirement may be interpreted as
corresponding to a situation where the government is able to
distribute less emergency water to residential consumers on a
daily basis.
[46] Note that equation (5) and our residential loss estimation methodology only calculate willingness to pay for
water in excess of the chosen basic water requirement. It is
assumed that the government will not allow residential
consumers to experience complete loss of water for health
and sanitization. However, it is clear that supplying water for
residential consumers’ health and sanitation purposes for
extended periods would be extremely expensive (for example, current charges for tanker-transported water in the Bay
Area are around 1 cent per gallon per mile), and costs to the
government represent social costs. Moreover, given consumers’ observed willingness to pay for bottled water, some
consumers would certainly be willing to pay extremely large
amounts for their first few gallons of water.
[47] By ignoring government costs for the emergency
provision of water, we underestimate the social cost of
residential water supply shortages. Thus, because our analysis allows businesses to experience complete outages, there
Table 8. Sensitivity of Residential Welfare Losses to Price
Elasticity of Demand for Water and Basic Water Requirementa
BWR = 13.2 gpcpd

Hayward M 7.0
27.55
1.62
5.03
2.76

h = 0.35
h = 0.41
h = 0.51

400.76
188.86
90.33

h = 0.35
h = 0.41
h = 0.51

45.60
27.69
17.23

BWR = 10 gpcpd

San Andreas
662.03
279.20
119.02

BWR = 6.6 gpcpd
1403.40
499.18
177.76

Hayward

36.94

Group definitions and time paths of water supply interruption and
rationing by group follow Figure 3 for the San Andreas Fault M 7.9
scenario and Figure 4 for the Hayward Fault M 7.1 scenario; note that group
definitions vary by earthquake scenario. Welfare losses are reported in
millions of dollars. Estimates assume that BWR = 10 gpcpd and that
h = 0.41.

67.37
36.94
20.85

124.10
57.67
27.65

a
Welfare losses are reported in millions of dollars. Estimates reported in
detail in Table 7 are shown in bold and assume that BWR = 10 gpcpd and
that h = 0.41 (following the mean reported in the meta-analysis of
Dalhuisen et al. [2003]). Dalhuisen et al. report a median residential price
elasticity of demand for water of 0.35, while the meta-analysis of Espey et
al. [1997] reports a value of 0.51.

12 of 14

W08423
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is an asymmetry in comparing business and residential
losses from water supply shortfall and the residential
estimates based on equation (5) should be viewed as lower
bounds. Rigorous analysis of the costs of emergency water
provision is a subject for future research, but these costs are
likely to be very large. For example, if we assume that the
costs of providing emergency water are given by NTX
where N is the number of consumers, T is the duration of
outage and attendant government water provision, and X is
the daily per capita cost of water provision, then a thirty day
outage in the Bay Area affecting a million consumers who
require 10 gpcpd and an average hundred-mile round trip
for water tankers will cost $300 million for transportation
costs alone. Logistics and distribution costs of water would
increase this amount enormously.
[48] In terms of risk preparedness policy, using a constant
price elasticity of demand to calculate residential losses
produces large heterogeneity in impacts as a function of
location of water demand relative to the earthquake epicenter, and of the availability of alternative, unaffected water
supplies. In the two earthquake scenarios we considered, the
smaller M 7.1 Hayward earthquake resulted in relatively
small residential losses, as most residential water users only
suffered small water supply shortfalls. The relatively large
M 7.9 San Andreas earthquake is predicted to result in large
residential losses (although still not of the same magnitude
as business losses). From a planning perspective, this
suggests that postearthquake residential water supply restoration efforts that aim to reduce welfare losses should
initially target very specific regions; this will be particularly
true if some areas have complete outages and the government must provide water for health and sanitation. For small
earthquakes that do not lead to severe water shortages to
residential users, water supply restoration efforts should
focus on business users.

5. Conclusion
[49] This paper has presented simple methodologies for
the estimation of the impacts of water supply interruption
and disruption on businesses and residential welfare. Both
methodologies use time profiles of water service interruption, rationing, and restoration combined with flexible loss
equations that are calibrated to local economic data. For
business interruption losses due to water supply disruption,
the marginal value of water may be parameterized using the
value of normal output and business resilience. In this
paper, we assume that the marginal loss due to water supply
disruption is increasing in the severity of the disruption, and
that extremely severe disruptions or complete outages will
lead to businesses shutting down. Residential loss estimation uses constant elasticity demand functions that are
calibrated to local price and quantity data and integrated
to estimate willingness to pay to avoid water shortages of
any given severity and duration.
[50] As an example of our methodology, we estimate the
economic losses to businesses and residential water users of
one of the major water supply systems of the San Francisco
Bay Area of California resulting from two potential earthquake scenarios. A magnitude 7.9 earthquake on the San
Andreas Fault is estimated to lead to $14.4 billion in
business interruption losses and $279 million in residential
welfare losses over the sixty day period before the resump-
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tion of normal service. A magnitude 7.1 earthquake on the
Hayward Fault is estimated to lead to $9.3 billion in
business interruption losses and $37 million in residential
welfare losses over the sixty day period before the resumption of normal service. The large difference between the
business and residential loss estimates is partly due to a lack
of data from extreme shortages with which to calibrate our
residential loss estimation function. We assume that the
government will be able to provide water for health and
sanitation purposes to residential consumers during the most
severe disruptions. Thus the reported residential losses
should be viewed as lower bounds, as the social cost of
government emergency water provision is not included in
our estimates, but is likely to be high.
[51] As a comparison to our business loss estimates, we
also calculate losses using several previously published
business loss functions and industry-specific data. These
include functional forms with constant marginal loss as
water supply disruption increases, and forms that allow
business resilience to decrease as the duration of water
supply interruption increases. For the water supply interruption and restoration profiles considered, we obtain similar results with all methodologies, although modeling
industry shutdown under large outages increases loss estimates. For large earthquakes such as the M 7.9 San Andreas
Fault scenario considered, residential losses from water
supply interruption may be large. However, assuming that
the government can provide water to meet basic health and
sanitation requirements, residential losses will be much less
than business interruption losses. Our results imply that
business and residential losses following earthquakes may
be highly variable over space and time, and by industry
type, suggesting that adaptable mitigation strategies are
needed to account for such variability.
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